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i
For several years extremely heated, although engaging a relatively nar­
row group of the participants of public life, discussion on the perspective of 
country’s regionalization has been going on (Gorzelak, Jałowiecki, eds., 1993; 
Latoszek, ed., 1993). The thematic axis of this extremely interesting and 
multitrend discussion is the problem of the model of the territorial system of 
the state and the difference in opinions concerning this problem vary from 
strongly decentralized autonomous-self-government model and the democratic 
self-government model assuming preserving the unitary structure of the state 
and co-operation between self-government and state structures in the negotia- 
tive solving of conflict situations and, what follows, the necessity of practicing 
the active regional policy of the state (Kołodziejski, 1993: 284—285). The 
advocates of the first of these models stress first of all the benefits which 
country’s regionalization may bring for the economy and state management, 
putting an equation mark between regionalization and self-government reform 
aiming at decentralization of the system of government up to creating ter­
ritorial autonomy (Bądkowski, 1990; Mażewski, 1991; Kwaśniewski, 1993; 
Kołodziejski, 1993: 279).
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The opponents of the autonomy of regions believe that it is not satisfac­
torily strongly justified in the historically shaped regional structure of Poland, 
and its introduction would inevitably mean erosion of the model of unitary 
state, its weakening and collapse (Kołodziejski, 1993:285). They, thus, 
suggest, indirect, self-government solutions, which fulfilling the assumptions of 
the representative democracy would enable running the active regional policy 
co-operating with the European Community system (Kołodziejski, 1993: 285). 
In my presentation I do not intend to polemize with any of these points of 
view. I think that they both contain many rational elements which should be 
the subject of the deepened, free from emotions scientific reflection, taking into 
account all the possible aspects of this undoubtedly difficult problem. It is 
worth remembering that contemporary regionalism is a phenomenon extreme­
ly heterogeneous in its sources and forms. As the experience of the Western 
countries show, regional movements may grow both on the ethnico-cultural 
basis (see the country of Basques, Flanders, Corsica) as well as economic 
(e.g. the Italian Lombardy League). Both of them develop most often in the 
regions peripheral towards the metropoly (political, administrative, cultural 
centre) in which the consciousness of cultural (ethnic, linguistic) separa­
teness is connected with less or more justified feeling of handicap and dis­
crimination. Contemporary regionalism referring often to the notion of cul­
tural identity which it defends puts itself on the side of political romanticism 
objecting the unification tendencies of the technicized and rationalized world 
(Kloskowska, 1991: 19). Raising the mottos of decentralization and subjec­
tivity of the local communities regionalism is the alternative towards excessive 
centralism taking in the extreme cases the form of “inner colonialism” (Lafont, 
1967). In the communities characterized by the strong feeling of ethni­
co-cultural marginality movement for regionalization usually contains de­
centralizing tendencies the clearer the greater the incoherence between the 
political and economic position of the region (Gourevitch, 1979: 306). Regio­
nalism, built on the basis of strong ethnic potential (language, customs 
differences, separateness of historical traditions, social institutions), may 
relatively easily change into small nationalism, or, using Gourevitch’s ter­
minology — into peripheral nationalism (Gourevitch, 1979: 306). Peripheral 
nationalism is not regionalism in the strict sense of the word but rather’ 
national-state creative movement aiming at separation or autonomy (Kwaś­
niewski, 1993: 191).
As all other varieties of nationalism — also this one may take diffe­
rent forms depending on the power of ethnic potential contained in it 
(Gourevitch). Aggressive ethnoregionalism defending the ethnic integrity or 
cultural identity absolutizes cultural differences, refers to tribal mentality, 
assumes the primacy of the rights of community over the rights of man 
(Finkielkraut, 1992: 80).
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2
Democratic changes taking place in Central-Eastern Europe for several 
years have enabled expression of opinions and articulation of the interests of 
regional communities and ethnic groups. It is undoubtedly a positive pheno­
menon and by all means much desired. Accepting, however, the natural in the 
democratic society revival of the feeling of affiliation to the local (regional) 
communities and identity claims of regional (ethnic) communities we cannot 
forget that local patriotism and affiliation to “the native land” cannot be put 
above the constitutionally guaranteed civil rights.
All the forms of group identity claims, independently of whether they 
concern big national groups or regional communities contain in themselves the 
exclusivist, particularist elements which require counterbalance in the form of 
universalist rules of the democratic state of law. Obviously in the democratic 
society every cultural community, ethnic or national, especially if it remains in 
the minority towards the rest of the citizens should have the right to culti­
vate one’s separateness and demand equal treatment. However, promoting the 
rights of the ethnic-cultural communities cannot take place at the cost of civil 
rights and they can be only guaranteed by the universalist constitutional rules. 
Everywhere where the group aims and identity claims have no support in the 
constitutional rules guaranteeing all the citizens equality towards law there is 
always a potential threat towards democratic order through particularism and 
exclusivism of “tribal thinking”.
In the recently translated into Polish small book Citizenship and National 
Identity (Warszawa, 1993) by Jürgen Habermas we find, among others, the 
following statement: “Democratic right for self-determination contains ob­
viously also the right for one’s own culture (political) [brackets by K.W.] 
being a point of reference for civil rights. This right does not cover [underlining 
by K.W.], however, the right for self-confirmation of cultural privilege of 
one's own [ethnico-cultural, K.W.] form of life” (Habermas, 1993: 35). And 
although the above arguments of Habermas refer to the immigration policy of 
the Western European countries stressing the differences between the political 
commonwealth based on the universal constitutional rules and specific eth­
nico-cultural form of life preserves its importance also in relation to the 
post-totalitarian societies in which still poor democratic institutions undergo, 
on the one hand, the pressure of tensions and frustrations connected with 
progress of market reforms, and on the other hand — freed from the ideolo­
gical corset and army tutelage — aggressive forms of group identity claims. 
Populism and nationalism are undoubtedly the greatest threats facing the new 
democracies of Central-Eastern Europe, they are joined by the aggressive 
ethnoregionalism which joins the feeling of regional separateness with political 
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postulates putting the rights to cultivate one’s own identity above civil rights 
(Finkielkraut, 1992: 80). Coming back to the Polish reality — apart from 
Upper Silesia, we do not have so far in Poland examples of politicizing 
regionalism. Here, due to historical reasons regional consciousness and the 
feeling of cultural separateness were and still are decisively more lively than 
in other regions of Poland (Ossowski, 1967; Kopeć, 1986; Robotycki, 1990). 
Occurring for several years in Upper Silesia regional movements formulate not 
only the postulates of revitalization of Silesian culture but also — in reference 
to the interwar period — they build their political programme on the basis of 
habitual regional tie treated as a substitute of ideological national consciousness 
(Ossowski, 1967: 251). Developed by some groups regional ideology (Wódz [J.], 
Wódz [KJ, 1991, 1992) contains in itself strong communal accents based on 
the erroneous and not having confirmation in the ethnosociological data belief 
that “Upper Silesian culture” is still, despite the passing of time and 
irreversible in consequences demographic-social processes of the post-war 
years, integral, coherent whole, exceptional in many respects (“traditional 
regional values — family, work, religion”) and attractive for all inhabitants of 
Upper Silesia, no matter who they are and where they come from (Declaration 
of Upper Silesian Union, 1990, wider see Gerlich, 1992). Stressing the cultural 
separateness of Upper Silesia, magnifying the objectively existing cultural 
differences between the natives and the newcomers with simultaneous belief of 
the supremacy of Upper Silesian culture over the culture of the newcomers 
(Gerlich, 1992) brings the contemporary Upper Silesian regionalism closer to 
the above described after P. A. Gourevitch — “small (peripheral) nationa­
lism”. In the programmes of some regional groups appear unfriendly even 
hostile accents towards everything which is “not Silesian”, one’s own tradi­
tions, customs, dialect — obtain a universal status, and a “stranger”, i.e. 
a newcomer embodies the whole evil of this world (compare Information 
Bulletin, No. 1 of the Movement of Silesian Autonomy, 1990). It is in this way 
that aiming at respecting cultural separateness of the native population and 
cultivating one’s own identity change into the discriminatory attempts towards 
the newcomers who feel threatened in their civil rights (Wódz [J.], Wódz [KJ, 
1994). What’s more, the more identity claims of the groups of natives are 
articulated as political projects put forward by various regional movements 
(regionalization of autonomy or separation) the greater the resonance among 
the newcomers of the mottos, declared by the nationalistic-populist groups on 
the threats of the territorial integrity of the state and erosion of the Polish 
national consciousness in Upper Silesia (Nawrocki, 1993: 137—180; Błasiak, 
1993). The situation is additionally complicated by the fact that as a result of 
known in the post-war history population movements in Upper Silesia lives 
today large, much bigger than before the Second World War percentage of the 
newcomers. For the majority this region has become of necessity or by choice 
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“the private motherland” to which as citizens of the same country they have 
the same rights as autochthonous population even if for one reason or another 
they do not identity themselves with the Silesian character in its cultural or 
ideological scope. It is impossible to imagine further development of this area 
facing the greatest in its history civilization challenges without these groups of 
population who do not want or cannot agree with thinking in the tribal 
categories excluding other than purely communal planes of understanding and 
dialogue. Identification with the small motherland, local community, town, 
region is rightly considered as necessary (although not sufficient) condition of 
citizens’ participation in the local social and political life. However, in the case 
of the regions of cultural borderland, and to such Upper Silesia surely belongs, 
it is not indifferent what will the place of this identification be. The present 
political disputes of the advocates and opponents of regionalization in Upper 
Silesia refer to whether this identification plane will be particular in its nature 
cultural-ethnic community or a democratic regional community built on the 
basis of the constitutional rules of civil rights and equalities. As the European 
examples prove only the latter is a good basis for building efficient, widely 
socially supported programmes of regional development (wider Wódz [J.], 
Wódz (K.J, 1994). Whether this simple if not banal truth will reach the leaders 
and activists of regional groups aspiring to represent the political interests of 
the natives will be shown by the coming local elections.1 They will also be 
a test of the agreement of the suggested by these groups visions of regional 
identity with the opinions and feelings of ordinary citizens, not engaging 
themselves daily in the public political debates about regionalism.
3
I would like to refer finally to the results of the sociological research 
which the Department of Research of Contemporary Culture has been running 
for several years within the framework of international research project on 
“Democratization in Central-East Europe and Its Impact on Inter-Ethnic 
Relations” co-ordinated by the European Center of Ethnic, Regional and 
Sociological Studies (ECERS) of the University of Maribor (Slovenia). The 
research undertaken nota bene before anybody could anticipate that 
the collapse of former Yugoslavia will lead to the tragedy of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina aimed at comparing the influence of political changes in 
Central-Easter Europe on the situation and mutual relationships between 
1 This text has been prepared before the local elections 1994.
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national minorities and ethnic groups living in the old countries of the bloc. 
The initial project prepared in 1991 by Prof. S. Devetak from Maribor 
anticipated, among others, carrying out sociological sounding in the areas 
inhabited by various ethnic groups in order to define the ethnic potential of 
these communities on the basis of empirical data (Gourevitch, 1979) and what 
follows, the probable sources of social mobilization of particular ethnic- 
cultural groups and resulting from them consequences for building the civil 
society. Not having enough space here for wider discussion of the research 
assumptions of the project I will limit myself to several explanations neces­
sary to understand the empirical data presented below. The methodol­
ogical assumptions of field work have been elaborated in collaboration by 
Prof. Sergej Flere from the ECERS in Maribor.
The starting point of the carried out analyses was quite obvious assumption 
that ethnocentrism and the attitudes of intolerance towards “strangers” 
connected with it are the phenomenon typical for the periods of economic 
crises (Hannan, 1979). One, can thus, assume that the observed in the majority 
of countries of the former Eastern Bloc phenomenon of ethnic mobilization is 
the understandable form of defence against the consequences of shock being 
for the societies of these countries the deep economico-systemic reforms having 
taken place for several years.
During turning points when the old institutional order collapses — eth­
nic identification (often connected with specific religion) becomes the only 
source of social support enabling to overcome the unbearable feeling of 
uncertainty and chaos (Dahrendorf, 1991: 128). Whether the growth of eth­
nic consciousness will be accompanied by isolationism, hostility towards other 
nations or ethnic groups depends on many factors — first of all, on the 
outcome of the current relationships between ethnic groups living in a given 
territory. The more elements of conflict than co-operation there are in it, the 
stronger and more fixed the mutual rancours and resentiments are, the greater 
the feeling of humiliation connected with real or supposed discrimination of 
one’s own culture, tradition, language by a dominating group (groups) — the 
greater the probability that identity claims will be of the offensive charac­
ter connected with the demands to make amends for wrongs even through 
raising the culture of ones ethnic group from “the lowlands” and making 
it a pattern binding all those living in a given territory (Wódz (K.J, 1993: 9). 
The source of ethnic conflicts may also be growing together with progress in 
the market reforms differences in the economic and social position of parti­
cular ethnic groups — more likely in these areas where the social stratifica­
tion overlaps without exception with ethnic divisions. The groups dissatis­
fied with their economic and social status will aim at changing it through 
obtaining greater access to authority and, thus, possibility of deciding about 
their own fate becoming independent of the state structure or total autonomy 
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(Toumon, 1989: 331—348). In Upper Silesia, especially in its industrial part in 
the whole post-war period one could point to the examples of overlapping 
ethnic-cultural divisions (of the regional origin) with social divisions (covering 
the differences in the level of education, professional structure, economic 
position, access to power) (wider see Błasiak, 1990). Understanding otherwise 
demands of levelling the chances of the members occupying so far worse 
positions on the scale of social stratification of ethnic groups have strong 
mobilization power, however, due to its particularist, anti-individualist charac­
ter they remain in conflict with the universalist rules of the civil society and 
free market rules (Flere, 1991: 185, 187).
Finally, the last may be the most important psychological element being as 
if the resultant of all the remaining ones — the syndrome of authoritarianism 
comprehensively described by T. Adorno and his co-workers in the research on 
the social sources of Nazism (Adorno et al., 1950). Not going at this point into 
details of the very concept discussed and analyzed many times in the sub­
ject literature (see, for example, Koralewicz, 1987), let’s remind that it refers to 
certain type of mentality the characteristic feature of which is combining the 
uncritical obedience towards authority, conventionalism and moral rigour, 
strong aggression directed against those who break out of social control, fata­
lism and stiffness of thinking, fascination of power and authority, tendency 
towards projection (i.e. working for the sources of evil in the outside world) 
and lack of auto reflection (Adorno et al., 1950). From the research of Adorno 
himself and his continuators it results, among others, that authoritarianism often 
goes together with ethnocentrism and both these attitudes increase especially in 
the periods of chaos and economic depression the results of which touch espe­
cially lower middle classes. There is no doubt that the present economic difficul­
ties experienced by the post-totalitarian societies are in many respects com­
parable with the economic crisis of the 1930s — uncertainty of tomorrow and 
chaos favour magical thinking susceptible to demagogy and populism.
Taking all these conditions into account, it was considered purposeful to 
measure the intensity of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism among the selected 
in terms of ethnic affiliation groups of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia (more 
precisely — its Katowice part) in connection with the evaluation of systemic 
changes in Poland after 1989.
The measurement was carried out with the help of the Likert type 
scale containing 24 statements referring to the three groups of problems 
mentioned above.2 Each of the statements was assigned 5 variants of answers
2 The questionnaire included standard statements from F- and E scales and several statements 
added by the former Yugoslav researchers D. Pantic from University of Belgrad and N. Tos, 
University of Lubljana, after S. Flere, “Démocratisation in Central-Eastern Europe and its 
Impact on Inter-Ethnic Relations”. Paper presented at 2-nd European Conference for Sociology, 
Budapest, 1995, p. 6.
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— from total approval (5 points) to negation (1 point) (see questionnaire, 
pp. 131—132). To 24 statements taking into account the three above 
mentioned examined measurements (“acceptance of civil society”, “ethno­
centrism”, “authoritarianism”) a list has been added presenting different 
types of social communities asking the examined to put them in order 
according to their importance for the examined themselves (see questionnaire, 
pp. 131—132). The research covered totally 340 persons in two stages. Stage 
I — carried out in autumn of 1992, 240 persons participated in it selected 
in a quota-lot way according to the criterion of ethnic auto-identification. 
For greater clarity of analyses, we considered in the research only three 
possibilities — Poles (120 persons), Germans (60 persons) and persons de­
fining themselves only through affiliation to the regional group (Silesians
— 60 persons), although we were aware that in reality the divisions of 
regional community are far more complicated and it was practically impossible 
to obtain any reliable data concerning the proportion of those three categories
Table 1
Sododemographic Structure of the Examined
Sododemographic 
variables
I stage of research (1992) II stage of research (1994)
N - 240 N - 100
Sex
Men 116 (48.3%) 43 (43%)
Women 124 (51.7%) 57 (57%)
Age
18—20 18 (7.5%) 12 (12%)
21—30 47 (19.6%) 32 (32%)
31-40 66 (27.5%) 25 (25%)
41—50 51 (21.2%) 11 (11%)
51—60 23 (9.6%) 9 (9%)
61—70 24 (10%) 8 (8%)
71 11 (4.6%) 3 (3%)
Education
Incomplete pri- Poles Silesians Germans Poles Silesians Germans
mary 2(0.8%) 1(0.8%) 0(0%) 1(1.7%) 0(0%) — —
Primary 57(23.7%) 30(25%) 12(20%) 15(25%) 15(15%) 3(6%) 12(24.0%)
Vocational 69(28.7%) 34(28.3%) 14(23.3%) 21 (35%) 28(28%) 11(22.%) 17(34%)
Secondary 83(34.6%) 44(36.7%) 21(35%) 18(30%) 45(45%) 30(60%) 15(30%)
Higher 29(12.1%) 11(9.2%) 15(21.7%) 5(8.3%) 12(12%) 6(12%) 6(12%)
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in the whole community (see Gerlich, 1992). Poles and Silesians have been 
drawn by lot from the representative sample of inhabitants of Katowice, 
Tychy, Ruda Śląska, Rybnik, Racibórz. The group of people defining 
themselves as Germans has been drawn by lot from the files of the society 
of German minority “Working community — reconciliation and future” 
registered in Katowice (by agreement of the head of this organization 
Mr Dietmar Brehmer). In the research in 1994, 100 respondents took part 
— 50 Poles and 50 Germans selected by quota. In the group of Poles the 
students from the University of Silesia dominated. (These researches were not 
of the representative character, detailed data concerning the structure of sex, 
age and education of both samples of the examined see Table 1.)
We will skip here the technical details of research stating only that 
the measurement procedure applied by us was of the multi-stage charac­
ter, first we counted the sum of points obtained by the respondents in each 
of the analyzed variables, then, having carried out the necessary mathema­
tical operations we divided the total number of points possible to be ob­
tained by each of the respondents into seven intervals in the decreasing 
system (from the greatest concentration of the specific attitude to the smal­
lest). Then it has been determined what percentage of the respondents 
from particular groups is included in these intervals. The final results of these 
operations for the group examined in 1992 are shown in Tables 2 to 4, for the 
group from 1994, 5 to 7 respectively. What results from them? First of all, as 
far as the research from 1992 is concerned, one can observe that Silesians are 
generally decidedly more than the remaining two groups favourable towards 
the democratic changes: political pluralism and market reforms. Poles 
are in the second place in this respect. The group of Silesians distinguishes
I group of Questions: Civil Society Orientation
Table 2
Total [N = 240] Poles [N - 120] Germans [N « 60] Silesians [N a 60]
1—0.4% (lack 
of acceptance) 1-0.8% 1—0.0% 1—0.0%
2—5.8% 2—5.8% 2—5.0% 2—6.7%
3—13.8% 3—12.5% 3—18.3% 3—11.7%
4—30.8% 4—30.0% 4—35.0% 4—28.3%
5—32.5% 5—36.7% 5—28.3% 5—28.3%
6—14.6% 6—10.8% 6—13.3% 6—23.3%
7—2.1% (full 
acceptance) 7—3.3% 7—0.0% 7—1.7%
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Table 3
II Group of Questions: Ethnocentridsm
Table 4
Total [N = 240] Poles [N = 120] Germans [N =60] Silesians [N = 60]
1—0.0% (maximum 
ethnocentridsm) 1—0.0% 1—0.0% 1-0.0%
2—16.7% 2—15.0% 2—20.0% 2—16.7%
3-35.0% 3—44.2% 3—26.7% 3—25.0%
4—36.3% 4—33.3% 4—38.3% 4—40.0%
5—7.5% 5—3.3% 5—11.7% 5—11.7%
6—3.8% 6—3.3% 6—3.3% 6—5.0%
7—0.8% (lack of
ethnocentridsm) 7—0.8% 7-0.0% 7—1.7%
in Group of Questions: Authoritarianism
Total [N = 240] Poles [N = 120] Germans [N = 60] Silesians [N — 60]
1—2.1% (maximum 
authoritarianism) 1—3.3% 1—1.7% 1—0.0%
2—14.6% 2—19.2% 2—10.0% 2—10.0%
3—24.6% 3—25.8% 3—23.3% 3—23.3%
4—32.1% 4—30.8% 4—28.3% 4—38.3%
5—17.9% 5—14.2% 5—25.0% 5—18.3%
6—5.8% 6—4.2% 6—6.7% 6—8.3%
7—2.9% flack of
authoritarianism) 7—2.5% 7—5.0% 7—1.7%
itself positively in terms of lower concentration of ethnocentrism and autho­
ritarianism, especially in comparison with Poles whose large percentage is 
situated highly on both scales. In the research in 1994 in which only Germans 
and Poles participated — the differences between these groups become much 
more clearer. The opponents of market and democracy come mainly from the 
first ones, they also stronger than Poles identify themselves with their ethnic 
group and show authoritarian tendencies.
The observations made so far become more meaningful in comparison with 
data on the identification of particular ethnic groups with different types of 
communities. The respondents were supposed to assign each of the included
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II Stage of Research: Civil Society Orientation
Table 5
Total [N - 100] Poles [N = 50] Germans [N — 50]
1—0% (lack of 
acceptance) 1—0% 1—0%
2—7% 2—0% 2—14%
3—23% 3—16% 3—30%
4—48% 4—62% 4—34%
5—20% 5—18% 5—22%
6—2% 6-^1% 6-0%
7—0% (full 
acceptance) 7—0% 7—0%
II Group of Questions: Ethnocentridsm
Table 6
Total [N - 100] Poles [N - 50] Germans [N = 50]
1—6% (full 
ethnocentridsm) 1—2% 1—10%
2—10% 2—4% 2—16%
3—34% 3—36% 3—32%
4—40% 4—40% 4—40%
5—9% 5—16% 5—2%
6—1% 6—2% 6—0%
7—0% (lack of 
ethnocentridsm) 7—0% 7—0%
in Group of Questions: Authoritarianism
Table 7
Total [N - 100] Poles [N - 50] Germans [N « 50]
1—3% (maximum 
authoritarianism) 1—0% 1—6%
2—9% 2-4% 2—14%
3—17% 3—6% 3—28%
4—37% 4—40% 4—34%
5—19% 5—24% 5—14%
6—10% 6—20% 6—4%
7—5% (lack of 
authoritarianism) 7—6% 7—0%
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in the comparison community the appropriate rank: from 1 — very impor­
tant to 5 — not important at all. For each of the communities the average 
rank has been calculated, then they were put in order from the most important 
to the least important for all ethnic groups.
In Table 8 the results obtained in the research from 1992 and 1994 
were presented. Most interesting are the differences between the Sile­
sians and the remaining two groups — for them decidedly the most impor­
tant categories of identification are town and region, for the Germans
— region is in the first place and nation comes next, for the Poles — nation 
and country. As can be seen, the local orientation of the Silesians, their 
affiliation to “the small motherland” do not have to be connected with 
increased ethnocentrism and lack of acceptance for pluralism. Such a con­
nection is more likely in the case of persons defining themselves as Ger­
mans — their feeling of regional affiliation contains strong load of ethno­
centrism. In the research of 1994 we also observe among Poles strengthening 
of ties with place of residence but national identification occupies here 
also high, second place. Poles from both of the examined groups more often 
than the remaining ethnic groups identify themselves with the universalisti- 
cally understood communities, such as world or humanity, decidedly less often
— with denomination communities.
Table 8
I stage of research — 1992 [N = 240]
Identification with Commtmity
(The importance of specific communities for particular categories of respondents — in the order 
from the most important to the least important community)
Total sample [N « 240] Poles [N - 210] Germans [60] Silesians [60]
nation nation region town, country 
and region
town, country state nation region and town, 
country
state town, country town nation
region world, humanity coreligionists state
professional group region professional group professional group
coreligionists coreligionists state coreligionists
world, humanity professional group Europe world, humanity
Europe Europe Central Europe Europe
Central Europe Central Europe world, humanity Central Europe
9 Ethnic Minorities...
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II stage of research — 1994 [N = 100]
Table 8 continued
Total sample [N « 100] Poles [50] Germans [50]
town, country town, countries nation
nation nation town, country
region world, humanity region
state region state
professional group professional group coreligionists
world, humanity state professional group
coreligionists Europe Central Europe
Central Europe Central Europe Europe and world, 
humanity
Europe coreligionists Europe and world, 
humanity
4
As it was already told, the pilot study of the interrelations between eth­
nic identifications of the group of inhabitants of Upper Silesia and their 
acceptance of democratic rules, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism was not 
of a representative character nor the results presented above could be treated 
as an overview of the attitudes of the whole population of inhabitants of 
Upper Silesia. Anyhow not overrating the importance of the interdependencies 
observed in both research, one can risk a statement that so far nothing shows 
that the aggressive ethnoregionalism will command obedience among these 
groups of population on behalf of which it, first of all, appears — thus, those 
which describe themselves as Silesians. The possible sources of ethnic conflict 
are connected rather with the processes of articulating the interests and 
ambitions of the German population, which after 1989 appeared on the local 
an regional scene as a very dynamic and efficient social actor and the po­
pulation with univocal Polish orientation oversensitive about state integrity. 
The growing importance of German Minority groups and close relationship of 
some of their members with such revisionists German organisations as the 
Association of Exiled (BdV), openly supporting the idea of the reunification 
of Upper Silesia with Germany, caused many fears on the side of Poles living
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here for a half of century. In the beginning of 1990s in Opole Silesia several 
actions of the German nationalistic groups like the construction of Wermacht 
Soldiers monuments in some villages, changes of the Polish names of the 
villages to the names coming from the 1930s caused the counteractions from 
the side of the Polish nationalists. In Katowice part of Upper Silesia, where 
only small group of native Silesians joined German Minority organisations 
— the main source of conflicts still remains the unfinished process of 
institutionalisation of regional consciousness and unsolved dilemmas between 
the closed ethnoregionalism, based on sharp distinction between “one’s 
countryman” and “foreigner” or open regionalism, based on universal, civil 
rights, guaranteeing the freedom of expression and representation of interests 
of all ethnic groups living here side by side. Not forejudging today the 
direction of evolution of ethnic relationship in Upper Silesia, one would have 
to warn all the responsible actors of the local political stage against attempts at 
combining the problem of ethnic-cultural identity of the inhabitants of this 
region with any political programmes, the answer to it may be the decided 
growth of nationalism both on the Polish and German side. Let’s hope that 
this will not happen and pragmatic reasons will win which will allow different 
ethnic groups to unite round constructive proposals of solutions of the 
dramatic civilisation challenges Upper Silesia is facing now.
Appendix
QUESTIONNAIRE
(Version used in the comparative field study realised under the programme: Démocratisation in 
Central-Eastern Europe and its Impact on Inter-Ethnic Realtions, coordinated by European 
Centre for Ethnic, Regional and Sociological Studies, University of Maribor. Director of the 
programme: Prof. Silvo Devetak. Director of the field study — Prof. Sergej Flere.
The following is a questionnaire constructed solely for scientific purposes. It is applied in a number 
of European countries. The results will be known only in aggregate form, meaning of individual 
answers will not be known. Anonymity is guaranteed. But as you represent a larger number of 
persons of the same characteristics, it is very important that you answer all the questions in full 
and earnestly, truly.
The following are certain statements which are neither true or false, but you are only to express an 
opinion of them.
+ + means you agree fully and without reservation
+ means you agree predominantly, possibly with a reservation
9*
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? means that you are unsure, ambivalent as to your stand towards the statement
— means that you predominantly disagree, possibly with a reservation
-----means that you fully and without reservation disagree
1. Full freedom of speech leads toward social disorganization.
2. The judiciary must always serve those in political power.
2a. A one party system provided for the unity of the people more.
3. Social progress will always be based upon private ownership.
4. Only multiparty system guarantees freedom of expression.
5. Socialism extended greater security to the average man than the present system.
6. Most people felt happier during the earlier system.
7. Democracy is good in theory, but in practice it brings about too many problems.
8. Ethnically mixed marriages are doomed to fail.
9. Every nationality must have its own state.
10. One can feel secure in an environment only when the majority of those dose to him pertain to 
the same nationality.
11. It is possible to achieve co-operation among nationalities, but not full trust.
12. Everyone should perceive that his nationality’s fate is his own fate.
13. I feel to the same extent pertaining to my nationality and to humanity.
14. The feeling of national (ethnic) pertainance is one of the most beautiful feelings.
15. It is senseless to say that all nationalities are equal, as it is evident that some are more worthy.
16. Those pertaining to my nationality should always value more our own nationality than 
others.
17. The most important thing children should learn is the respect for parents.
18. Without a leader every man is like a man without a head.
19. There are two basic types of people in the world, weak and strong ones.
20. One should always obey one’s superiors, regardless of whether they are right.
21. What is today more important than good laws and programs, are fearless and tireless leaders.
22. One loses respect for the people with whom one becomes too dose.
23. People do not know how much their lives are controlled by conspirades of those in power.
We will now mention some belongings (pertainances) which may be important for an individual. 
Please assess how much the following belongings are important for you personally (very 
important, rather important, of average importance, of little importance, of no importance).
1. town, village
2. region
3. nationality
4. confession
5. occupation (profession)
6. state
7. Central Europe
8. Europe
9. The world, humanity
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